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The robust growth of the U.S. economy between 1996 and 1999 spurred U.S. demand for 
foreign goods and contributed to a surge in the U.S. trade deficit. An analysis of the effects 
of the expansion on the trade balance suggests that the economic boom can account for
roughly a third of the sharp rise in the merchandise trade deficit during this period. 
The U.S. trade deficit nearly tripled between 1996 and
1999, rising from $89 billion to a record $254 billion
(Chart 1). Regarded by many commentators as a sign of
the U.S. economy’s vulnerability,1 this striking increase
has prompted considerable discussion of the economic
forces behind the trade balance.
Most analysts would agree that the most important
immediate, or proximate, cause of the rising deficit in
this period was the strength of the U.S. economy 
relative to the economies of the nation’s major trading
partners. U.S. GDP growth averaged 4.2 percent per year
between 1996 and 1999, while output in Japan and the
Euro area grew at average annual rates of -0.2 percent
and 2.5 percent, respectively. This disparity in growth
rates had a marked effect on the balance of trade flows
to and from the United States. Imports rose rapidly as
the booming American economy drove up U.S. con-
sumption and investment demand—including the
demand for foreign goods. At the same time, exports
rose slowly as the sluggish growth of the United States’
trading partners curbed the demand for U.S. goods.2
Together, these trends appear to explain much of the
deterioration in the trade deficit. By implication, if the
U.S. economy had grown at a slower rate, or if other
countries’ economies had grown faster, the U.S. trade
deficit would surely have been smaller. The question is,
how much smaller? 
In this edition of Current Issues, we develop a useful
approximation of the burgeoning U.S. economy’s impact
on the trade deficit between 1996 and 1999.3 To do this,
we answer a key hypothetical question: What would the
U.S. trade deficit have been if the United States and its
trading partners were operating at potential—rather
than actual—output, holding all else equal? We make
potential output our benchmark because it can be inter-
preted as the cyclically adjusted level of output—that is,
output adjusted to exclude the effects of an economy’s
cyclical expansion and contraction. Using this concept,
we compute a “potential output” trade balance that 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
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represents the trade balance exclusive of cyclical
forces. By calculating the difference between the actual
trade balance and the potential output trade balance, we
can determine the extent to which cyclical forces con-
tributed to the worsening of the U.S. trade balance.
Our analysis reveals that the above-potential growth
of the U.S. economy can in fact explain a sizable portion
of the expanding trade deficit. By our calculations,
cyclical forces in the United States—in particular, the
import surge produced by the economic boom—
accounted for $45 billion, or almost one-third, of the
$142 billion increase in the deficit between 1996 and
1999.4 However, this result also suggests that, had the
economy dropped back to a potential output level, the
deficit would still have risen sharply. Without the contri-
bution of U.S. cyclical forces, the deficit would have
grown by $97 billion over the 1996-99 period. 
By investigating developments within the period, we
conclude that robust economic growth had its greatest
effect on the U.S. trade balance between 1996 and 1998.
In 1999, however, noncyclical forces such as changes in
interest rates, exchange rates, and productivity made a
vastly larger contribution to the rise in the trade deficit. 
The Potential Output Trade Balance
To assess how much of the increase in the U.S. trade
deficit over the 1996-99 period was due to the strong
economy, we first establish a precise definition of
“strong.” We interpret strong to be output (GDP) that is
above “potential.” Potential output is a widely used mea-
sure that has been defined as either the full-employment
level of output or the maximum output an economy can
sustain without generating a rise in inflation.5 Both 
definitions are consistent with the view that potential
output is a cyclically adjusted measure of output. 
We define the potential output trade balance as the
trade balance that would occur if the United States and
its trading partners were at potential output, all else
equal. As we do with potential output, we interpret this
indicator as a cyclically adjusted measure. By calculat-
ing the difference between the actual trade balance and
the potential output trade balance, we can isolate that
part of the deficit that is attributable to cyclical forces
in the United States and its trading partners. Our mea-
sure is analogous to the full-employment budget deficit
measure that is widely used to gauge the nation’s 
cyclically adjusted fiscal position.
We note at the outset that the potential output trade
balance can vary from year to year not only because of
changes in potential output, but also because of other,
noncyclical forces, such as changes in interest rates,
exchange rates, and other variables. A depreciation in
the U.S. dollar, for instance, would tend to improve the
U.S. potential output trade balance because a weaker
dollar makes U.S. exports less expensive abroad and
imports more expensive for U.S. consumers.6
Calculating the Potential Output Trade Balance
To calculate the U.S. potential output trade balance, we
gather data on three key components. We begin by
obtaining measures of potential output or GDP for the
United States and its major trading partners. We then
select estimates of the “elasticity” (the sensitivity, or
responsiveness) of import demand to changes in
national income. Finally, we collect data on trade flows
with the major U.S. trading partners.
In choosing measures of potential GDP, we bear in
mind that economists define and estimate potential 
output in several ways.7 Some employ sophisticated 
statistical methodologies that use time-series data on
GDP and other variables (see, for example, Kuttner
[1994] or Gerlach and Smets [1997]). By comparison,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) construct measures based on the productive
potential of capital, labor, and technology in the econ-
omy. Because the OECD provides broad coverage of
countries and time periods, we employ its data, where
available, throughout our analysis.8 For countries with
no published measure of potential output, we use a 
simple econometric technique to generate values for
potential output (see box). 
For both the United States and its major trading part-
ners, we use the existing empirical literature to select a
measure of the elasticity of import demand to changes
in national income.9The more elastic a country’s import
demand is to national income, the more imports will
rise in response to an increase in national income.
Formally, the elasticity gives the percentage increase in
import demand in response to a 1 percent increase in
income. In our benchmark specification, we assume
that a 1 percent increase in national income leads to a 
2 percent increase in import demand for the United
States (elasticity = 2) and to a 1.5 percent increase for
its major trading partners (elasticity = 1.5). 
Next, we collect data on U.S. merchandise imports
from, and exports to, the country’s eighteen largest trad-
ing partners. Trade with these nations constitutes
roughly 80 percent of total U.S. merchandise trade.10
Moreover, the merchandise trade deficit with these
countries increased by $142 billion between 1996 and
1999, and thus accounted for 83 percent of the increase
in the overall (merchandise plus services) trade deficit.
Once we have assembled the three components of the
potential output trade balance—potential output mea-
sures, elasticity estimates, and trade flow data—we can
calculate the value of U.S. imports and exports when allcountries are operating at potential output.11 (In the box
above, we describe the equation used to compute our
benchmark estimates of the potential output trade 
balance.) We then compare the movements of the poten-
tial output trade balance with those of the actual trade
balance over the 1996-99 period. Note that the relation-
ship of the potential output trade balance to the actual
trade balance will depend on the deviations of the United
States’and its major trading partners’actual output from
potential output and on their respective import demand
elasticities. For instance, when actual output is greater
than potential output, actual imports will be greater than
potential output imports. In addition, the more sensitive
U.S. import demand is to the level of national income,
the more pronounced the gap between U.S. actual
imports and potential output imports will be. 
Cyclical Forces’ Role in the Trade Deficit Increase
Our calculations reveal that the actual and the potential
output trade deficits were virtually the same in 1996,
about $160 billion (Chart 2). Over the next three years,
both deficits widened, but the actual trade deficit
expanded by more. The difference—$46 billion, or one-
third of the overall increase in the deficit—can be
attributed to cyclical forces.12 Chart 3 expresses these
deficits as shares of actual GDP.
Our analysis also allows us to determine whether
higher U.S. imports or lower demand abroad for U.S.
exports is chiefly responsible for this increase in the
cyclical part of the trade deficit. We find that higher
U.S. imports accounted for 97 percent of the cyclical
increase: $45 billion of the rise in the U.S. trade deficit
between 1996 and 1999 can be attributed to the nation’s
booming economy, with the low-to-moderate growth of
the major U.S. trading partners contributing a mere 
$1 billion. This result occurred mainly because the
trading partners, as a group, had very little net change
in their deviation between actual and potential output
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Chart 2
U.S. Actual and Potential Output Trade Balances














Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the International Monetary 
Fund and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes: Trade balances are based on merchandise trade with the nation’s top 
eighteen trading partners. The dashed line represents the potential output trade 
balance consistent with an import demand elasticity specification of 2 for the 
United States and 1.5 for its trading partners.
The following basic expression represents the U.S. trade
balance as the sum of U.S. exports to, minus the sum of
U.S. imports from, the nation’s trading partners:
Actual trade balance = 
where c = 1, 2,…, n denotes particular trading partners.
We use the following equation to construct our benchmark
estimates of the U.S. potential output trade balance (PTB): 
PTB = potential output exports – potential output imports
=
where Xc = actual U.S. exports to country c,
Mc = actual U.S. imports from country c,
gc = output gap (of country c or the United States),
where the output gap is the difference between actual
output and potential output, measured as a percentage
of potential output, and 
ε = income elasticity of import demand in the United
States (u.s.) or the rest of the world (r.o.w.). We set the
elasticity to be 2 and 1.5 for the United States and the
rest of the world, respectively.
Obtaining Measures of the Output Gap
For countries with no available OECD output gap data, we
employ the following methodology on annual data:
1) We regress the natural log of real GDP on a time trend
and the time trend squared: 
ln(y) = α 0 + α 1
∗ Τ  + α 2 
∗ Τ 2 + ε.
2) We use the estimated coefficients from the regression to
obtain the fitted values for (the natural log of) real GDP.
By taking the exponential, we then obtain our estimate
of potential real GDP.
3) To obtain each year’s output gap, we subtract measured
potential real GDP from actual real GDP and divide the
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Construction of the U.S. Potential Output Trade Balance
,
,during this period. Individual countries experienced
large swings in their output gaps—actual output minus
potential output—but the swings were largely offset-
ting. In particular, positive movements in the output
gaps for Canada, Mexico, and most European countries
countered negative movements in all Asian countries. 
Because our estimates of the potential output trade
deficit depend partly on our specification of import
demand elasticities, we analyze how our estimates would
change under alternative elasticity specifications.13 If
we specify the elasticity of U.S. import demand to be
2.5—rather than 2, as in our benchmark estimates—
then the potential output trade deficit will show a
smaller increase over the 1996-99 period (Chart 4, speci-
fication “a”).14 As a result, the gap between the poten-
tial output trade deficit and the actual trade deficit
widens, so that about $61 billion, or 43 percent, of the
overall increase in the U.S. trade deficit can be attrib-
uted to cyclical forces. Alternatively, if we substitute an
elasticity specification of 1.5 (Chart 4, specification
“b”) for the benchmark value of 2, the potential output
trade deficit will show a larger increase between 1996
and 1999. Under this specification, the gap with the
actual trade deficit narrows, suggesting that only about
$35 billion, or 25 percent, of the increase in the U.S.
trade deficit can be attributed to cyclical forces. This
exercise helps us to set upper and lower limits on the
importance of cyclical forces; such forces can explain
between 25 and 43 percent of the overall increase in the
trade deficit. 
Returning to our benchmark specification and look-
ing more closely at the 1996-99 period, we find that the
importance of cyclical forces changed sharply within
the period. If we confine our analysis to the first 
two years, our estimates of the potential output trade
deficit show an increase of only $26.7 billion. Since the
actual deficit grew by $61.4 billion between 1996 and
1998, we calculate that $34.7 billion of the increased
deficit—or 57 percent of the overall rise—could be
attributed to cyclical forces. Thus, for these two years,
we conclude that the majority of the increase in the U.S.
trade deficit would vanish once the United States and
other countries returned to potential output growth.15
However, when we calculate the change in the poten-
tial output trade balance in 1999, we obtain a consider-
ably different result. For that year, we find that only 
$12 billion, or 14 percent, of the $81 billion increase in
the trade deficit can be attributed to cyclical forces.
Thus, as the trade deficit continued to grow, the cyclical
position of the U.S. economy lost prominence as a
determinant of this increase.
One possible explanation for the reduced importance
of cyclical forces in 1999 centers on statistical revisions
to the data. Estimates of the U.S. potential growth rate
have been increasing over time. In June 1999, the
OECD estimated the rate to be about 2.9 percent, but by
December its estimate had been raised to 3.35 per-
cent.16 If we use the 2.9 percent potential output growth
rate in our calculations—rather than the 3.35 percent
rate—the gap between actual output and potential out-
put becomes larger and the share of the increase in the
trade deficit attributable to cyclical forces rises from 
14 to 22 percent. Nevertheless, even with this adjust-
ment to the data, the contribution of the booming econ-
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Chart 3
U.S. Actual and Potential Output Trade Balances 


















Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the International Monetary 
Fund and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Trade balances are based on merchandise trade with the nation’s top 
eighteen trading partners.
Chart 4
Sensitivity Analysis of the U.S. Potential Output 
Trade Balance































Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the International Monetary 
Fund and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Trade balances are based on merchandise trade with the nation’s top 
eighteen trading partners.omy to the 1999 expansion of the deficit remains
somewhat modest. Consequently, we infer that in 1999
economic forces other than cyclical ones played a much
more significant role. 
Forces behind the Growing Potential Output 
Trade Deficit
For the 1996-99 period as a whole, cyclical forces can
account for one-third of the increase in the trade deficit.
What other factors, then, account for the remaining
two-thirds of the deficit increase in these years? This
question is equivalent to asking, what explains the
growth in the potential output trade deficit? The poten-
tial output trade deficit increased, in terms of both level
and share of GDP, throughout the 1990s (Charts 2 and
3). In 1999, it made up $258 billion—or about 85 per-
cent—of the actual $302 billion deficit. As suggested
earlier, part of the increase in this deficit can be attrib-
uted to upward revisions in the OECD’s estimates of the
U.S. potential output growth rate. Nevertheless, this 
factor is only a small part of the explanation.
A better understanding of the potential output trade
deficit can come from a recognition that the U.S. trade
and current account balances are similar, both concep-
tually and empirically. The current account balance
includes the trade balance plus investment income and
transfers. The latter two components have been small
recently, totaling roughly $10 billion to $15 billion. The
current account deficit also represents the excess of
U.S. investment over U.S. saving. Hence, to a large
extent, the trade deficit has simply been the counterpart
to rapidly increasing U.S. investment. Between 1996
and 1999, the nation’s real investment grew about 
33 percent. The strong investment climate in this period
stemmed largely from noncyclical forces such as rela-
tively low interest rates, an appreciating dollar, greater
productivity growth, and a stable inflationary environ-
ment. These forces likely accounted for much of the
increase in the potential output trade deficit. 
To finance this investment boom, the United States
borrowed abroad; foreign countries invested heavily here.
In other words, foreign countries in this period found real
and financial U.S. assets more attractive than the assets of
other countries.17 This desire to purchase U.S. assets, in
turn, drove up the dollar and kept interest rates low—
conditions that contributed to the increase in the trade
deficit. Thus, the growing trade deficit in the late 1990s
can also be viewed as the outcome of the fact that U.S.
assets in this period were in high demand worldwide.
Conclusion
By comparing movements in the nation’s actual trade
balance with movements in the “potential output” trade
balance, we have shown that the U.S. economic boom
can account for $45 billion, or about 32 percent, of the
1996-99 leap in the U.S. trade deficit. Nevertheless,
most of the increase over the past three years—approxi-
mately two-thirds—has likely resulted from other, non-
cyclical forces, such as relatively low interest rates, a
strong dollar, and high productivity growth.
By extension, a reversal of any of these forces could
eventually bring down the deficit. If, for example, U.S.
GDP fell below potential, the trade deficit would begin
to decline, as it has in the past three months. Alter-
natively, if a savings decline or an investment boom
occurred abroad, world interest rates would tend to rise,
adversely affecting U.S. investment and curbing U.S.
imports. In a third possible scenario, substantial growth
in output and productivity in other countries could
intensify the demand for U.S. exports and lead, perhaps,
to a decline in the prevailing capital inflows. Such
developments would put downward pressure on the dol-
lar and upward pressure on interest rates, and thereby
help to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. 
A final, more subtle factor that might lower the
deficit would come into play only over time—that is,
beyond the short-term horizon assumed in our analysis.
The flip side of the sizable trade deficit is the large
capital inflows associated with strong perceived invest-
ment opportunities in the United States. If these oppor-
tunities generated substantial realized gains, then the
country would be in a good position to “pay back” its
borrowing. In other words, in the medium and long run,
high GDP growth would help lead to smaller trade
deficits because it would create the resources needed
for the United States to repay its debt. 
Notes
1. See, for example, “Economy May Have a Soft Spot,” New York
Times, June 10, 2000, sec. C, p. 1, and “Trade Deficit Could Signal
Danger Ahead,” New York Times, June 8, 2000, sec. C, p. 2.
2. Between 1996 and 1999, imports grew at twice the rate of
exports: 9.1 percent as compared with 4.5 percent. In 2000, import
growth continued to outstrip export growth. With imports rising 
18 percent and exports increasing 11 percent, the deficit climbed to
$370.4 billion. 
3. Our analysis is not intended to offer a complete explanation for
the growing deficit. Such an explanation would require a quantita-
tive evaluation of the importance of a booming U.S. economy, as
well as of the other commonly cited proximate causes of the deficit,
such as the relatively low interest rates and the relatively strong dol-
lar. It would also require an understanding of the fundamental fac-
tors that underlie the proximate causes, such as U.S. monetary and
fiscal policy or the U.S. productivity surge. Moreover, an under-
standing of the linkages between the fundamental factors and the
proximate causes would be needed. 
4. These calculations are based on U.S. merchandise trade with the
country’s top eighteen trading partners. Cyclical forces in the rest of
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the world accounted for only $1 billion of the $142 billion increase
in the deficit.
5. See, for example, De Masi (1997).
6. Note that we are using a short-run framework that is best applied
to a horizon of a few years. 
7. Barrell and Sefton (1995) review the methods used to estimate
potential output. 
8. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(1999b). For details on the OECD methodology, see Giorno et al.
(1995). The OECD reports potential output in the form of an “output
gap”—actual output measured as a percentage deviation from poten-
tial output. Thus, a 1 percent output gap indicates that actual output
is 1 percent higher than potential output. By this measure, the United
States had a 2.0 percent output gap in 1998 and a 2.5 percent gap in
1999. For details on the IMF methodology, see De Masi (1997). 
9. Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (1998) compile existing esti-
mates of income elasticities of import demand. They find that the
elasticity is approximately 2 for the United States and roughly 1.5
for its major trading partners.
10. It accounted for 77 percent and 78 percent of total U.S. trade in
1998 and 1999, respectively.
11. We use output as a proxy for income. 
12. The weight attributed to cyclical forces in 1996-99 is substan-
tial. By our calculations, during the last episode of increasing trade
deficits, the mid-1980s, cyclical forces accounted for only about 
17 percent of the increase.
13. We choose our alternative elasticities to be about 1 standard
error around our benchmark estimates; we draw on Marquez
(1990), whose estimated elasticities for both the United States and
its trading partners have standard errors of around 0.5. We do not
report results using the lower bound of 1 as the elasticity of the trad-
ing partners because the results are virtually the same as those
obtained using the benchmark specification.
14. This result may seem counterintuitive. During this period,
actual output grew faster than potential output. The more sensitive
U.S. import demand is to national income (output), the greater the
increase in imports that is generated by the above-potential output
growth. This implies that a larger fraction of the increase in actual
imports (and the actual trade deficit) can be attributed to cyclical
forces. Then it follows that a smaller fraction of the increase in
actual imports (and the actual trade deficit) can be attributed to
changes in the potential output trade deficit.
15. In an earlier study, we performed this calculation using IMF
data, in place of OECD data, on U.S. potential output; our results
were essentially the same for 1996-98.
16. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(1999a, 1999b). The U.S. potential output growth rate is now esti-
mated to exceed 4 percent (see, for example, Standard and Poor’s
DRI December 2000 forecast of GDP growth and the GDP gap).
17. See Higgins and Klitgaard (1998) for an analysis of this trend
and its connection to the current account deficit.
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